



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

This volume illustrates another tendency of the society, the publication of matter of little legal value, though interesting to a student of the constitutional history of England. Since this volume appeared we know a good deal more than before about that obscure body, the Court of Requests; we know something more about the life of common people in the Tudor period; but we do not know a particle more about the history of English law. Perhaps the rolls of the King's Courts alone would inform us, and the Society cannot be constantly occupied with those rolls.

The Court of Requests was the "poor man's court" of equity, the civil side of the Star Chamber. It took its procedure from the civil law, and sent out commissions to magistrates to take testimony. In the files of the court is a mass of testimony, taken on interrogatories, parts of which form the most valuable portion of the records here published.

The court is chiefly of importance as having been involved in a quarrel as to jurisdiction with the Common Pleas and the King's Bench; a merry war of injunction and prohibition marked the reign of James, and the court finally fell with the first Charles. The apologist for the Court of Requests was the great lawyer, Sir Julius Cæsar, for many years a Master of Requests. He derived the jurisdiction of the Court from the Privy Council, of which it claimed to be an offshoot. The King in Council, according to this opinion, still had plenary power to establish new courts by a process that reminds one of the budding and the cellular growth of polyps. The common lawyers, on the other hand, held that all courts must be by custom, statute, or ancient grant, and that the Court of Requests was an unconstitutional novelty. "The Judges of the Court of Whitehall," said the Common Bench, "have none authoritie either to sitt there or to comitt any man from thence." Coke discharged on Habeas Corpus one held for contempt of the Requests, and ordered him to bring an action for false imprisonment. Notwithstanding this double severity, the Requests continued to grow in the sunshine of court favor, and only fell with the fall of Prerogative at the civil war.

The most important cases of which the records are here published had to do with the efforts of tenants to establish against their lords the ancient customs of manors. The disorders of the War of the Roses and the dissolution of the monasteries seriously wrenched the land-laws. Manors lost alternately their freehold and their copyhold tenants, until every occupant was treated by his lord as a tenant at will, and the lord was likely to be able to defend such treatment in a court of law. The Court of Requests was regarded as more favorable to tenant rights; and though in the cases here reported the Court seems to have found no method of modifying the law to the tenant's advantage, it exercised a persuasive influence over the landlords, and thus to an extent ameliorated the plaintiff's woes.

The other cases seem not to be important. Mr. Leadam's editorial work, as has been said, gives strength and character to the volume.

J. H. B.

A SKETCH OF ANNE ROBERT JACQUES TURGOT. By James M. Barnard. Boston. 1898. pp. 63.

Mr. James M. Barnard, of Boston, a gentleman much interested in the improvement of instruction in the law schools of our country, has recently presented to our law library a valuable sketch of Turgot, with various comments upon his character and public services. It contains a letter of

Turgot to Dr. Price of England, written in March, 1778, communicating suggestions as to our American constitution of that period. Naturally enough, he fails to observe the real aim of our revolution, and judges us as if we were trying to ground our constitutions on first principles, instead of merely applying to better advantage our inherited outfit of English ideals. But, nevertheless, these are the comments of a great and wise man, and we have reason to thank the kind friend that has made them accessible to us in the attractive little pamphlet above mentioned.

J. B. T.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY. RAWLE'S REVISION. VOL. 2 — J. to Z.
By John Bouvier. A new edition by Francis Rawle. Boston: The Boston Book Co. 1897. pp. 1254.

To approach a law dictionary in its entirety on criticism bent does not at first blush strike one as an inspiring task. The high reputation of this standard work and Mr. Rawle's success with his previous edition of it, however, nerve the critic for the attack, and fortunately the study proves happier than the promise. There is much to please the general reader, much entertainment in this book, though its existence, of course, is excused only by its utility. It is unnecessary to add anything by way of general criticism to the review of the first volume of the present edition which will be found in 11 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 420. It is possible, however, to consider this second volume in some of its details.

The dictionary is very complete. It would be difficult to hit on any topic which could properly be found in a law dictionary which is not discussed in this book. Not only are technical and "law words," if the expression may be permitted, defined, but words of ordinary use are taken up from the lawyer's point of view. For instance, the word "milk" might be omitted, not unreasonably, from a law dictionary. On page 411, however, "milk" is defined to be by weight of adjudicated cases skim milk, and the general American statutes providing for its inspection are considered. Quaint and almost forgotten legal terms, too, are discussed. Examples of these are "Tour d'Échelle" or the old right existing in certain parts of France of resting a ladder on your neighbor's wall, and "sworn brothers," which treats of formal covenants of friends to share each other's fortunes.

Important legal topics are discussed with a broad comprehension and with logical plan. When possible, the derivation of the word is given, then its short meaning, then its established legal significance, — as, for example, Baron Alderson's classic definition of negligence (p. 478), — then a general discussion of the whole subject embraced by the heading, including many citations by way of authority and illustration. The discussions of "mental suffering," "tort," "partnership," "libel," and "malice" struck the writer as especially helpful. There is much more than mere definition; there is enlightened consideration in accord with advanced but generally accepted legal ideas.

Certain other details deserve to be noticed. There are no less than forty pages of legal maxims briefly defined and supported by authorities; brief summaries of the constitutions and general laws of all the States of our Union; a list of the leading English and American reports with their abbreviations and the periods they cover; and discussions of statutes of present and historical importance such as the Thelusson Act and *Quia Emptores*.